Constitution facing challenges from autonomous institutions, including judiciary, says former Supreme Court Judge

Former Supreme Court Justice (Retd.) Sudershan Reddy's assertion that the Indian Constitution faces challenges from autonomous institutions, including the judiciary, and his highlighting of the Governor's non-impeachable status as a constitutional vulnerability, brings to the forefront critical debates surrounding institutional accountability, constitutionalism, and the delicate balance of powers in India's democratic framework. The **background context** for Justice Reddy's remarks lies in the continuous tension between various pillars of the state—the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary—in a vibrant democracy like India. While the Constitution meticulously delineates powers and responsibilities, the practical exercise of these powers often leads to friction. The judiciary, as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and guardian of fundamental rights, has historically expanded its role through doctrines like judicial review and judicial activism. This expansion, while often lauded for protecting citizens' rights and upholding constitutional principles, sometimes draws criticism for perceived overreach into policy-making or executive functions. Justice Reddy's statement resonates with concerns about institutions, including the judiciary, operating in ways that might deviate from, or challenge, the spirit and letter of constitutional norms. **What happened** is that Justice Reddy, a seasoned jurist, articulated a concern that despite the Constitution being the supreme law, various autonomous institutions, including the very institution tasked with upholding it—the judiciary—may at times pose challenges to its foundational norms. He explicitly stated that all institutions, including courts, are bound by constitutional norms. Furthermore, he pointed out a specific constitutional **vulnerability**: the inability to impeach a Governor for misconduct. This highlights a perceived gap in the accountability mechanism for a crucial constitutional office. The **key stakeholders** involved in this discussion are primarily the **Judiciary** (Supreme Court, High Courts), the **Executive** (the Governor, the President, the Union government, and State governments), and the **Legislature** (Parliament and State Assemblies). The **Constitution of India** itself is a central stakeholder, as it is the supreme document whose sanctity and adherence are being debated. The **people of India** are also key stakeholders, as the effective functioning and accountability of these institutions directly impact their rights, governance, and democratic participation. **Why this matters for India** is profound. Firstly, it touches upon the foundational principle of **constitutionalism** – the idea that governmental power is limited by a constitution. If autonomous institutions, including the judiciary, are seen to challenge constitutional norms, it can erode public trust in the system and potentially lead to an imbalance of power. Secondly, the issue of the Governor's accountability directly impacts **federalism**. The Governor, appointed by the President (Article 155) and holding office during the pleasure of the President (Article 156), acts as a vital link between the Union and the States. However, the absence of a clear impeachment process for misconduct, unlike for the President (Article 61) or Supreme Court/High Court judges (Article 124(4)), makes the office susceptible to political influence from the Centre, potentially undermining state autonomy and fair governance. Controversies surrounding the Governor's role in government formation, dissolution of assemblies, and assent to bills have frequently strained Centre-State relations. From a **historical context**, the framers of the Constitution debated the Governor's role extensively. While some argued for an elected Governor to ensure democratic accountability to the state, the Constituent Assembly ultimately opted for an appointed Governor to preserve national unity and prevent separatist tendencies, viewing the Governor as a crucial bridge between the Centre and States. However, the mechanisms for ensuring the Governor's impartiality and accountability were less robustly defined than for other high constitutional offices. Over the decades, various commissions, such as the **Sarkaria Commission (1983)** and the **Punchhi Commission (2007)**, have recommended reforms regarding the Governor's appointment, tenure, and removal to ensure impartiality and prevent misuse of the office. The judiciary's role in upholding the Constitution has also evolved, notably with the **Kesavananda Bharati case (1973)**, which established the 'Basic Structure Doctrine', empowering the judiciary to strike down constitutional amendments that violate the Constitution's fundamental features. The **future implications** of these concerns are significant. Justice Reddy's statement serves as a call for introspection for all institutions to adhere strictly to their constitutional mandates and practice self-restraint. It fuels the ongoing debate about strengthening checks and balances and ensuring greater accountability across the board. For the Governor's office, it reiterates the need for legislative or constitutional reforms to introduce a more transparent and impartial mechanism for removal, perhaps similar to that for a High Court judge, to protect the office from political manipulation and enhance its constitutional legitimacy. This would bolster India's federal structure and strengthen democratic governance by ensuring that all constitutional functionaries are held to high standards of conduct and accountability, ultimately reinforcing the supremacy of the Constitution. Related constitutional articles include: **Article 153** (Governors of States), **Article 155** (Appointment of Governor), **Article 156** (Term of office of Governor), **Article 163** (Council of Ministers to aid and advise Governor), **Article 356** (Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in State), **Article 61** (Procedure for impeachment of the President), and **Article 124(4)** (Procedure for removal of a Supreme Court Judge). The broader principles of judicial review (e.g., **Article 13**, **Articles 32 and 226**) and the separation of powers are also central to this discussion.